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With complete information, choice of one option over another conveys prefer-
ence. Yet when search is incomplete, this is not necessarily the case. It may in-
stead reﬂect unawareness that a superior alternative was available. To separate
these phenomena, we consider nonstandard data on the evolution of provisional
choices with contemplation time. We characterize precisely when the resulting
data could have been generated by a general form of sequential search. We char-
acterize also search that terminates based on a reservation utility stopping rule.
We outline an experimental design that captures provisional choices in the pre-
decision period.
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1. Introduction
In principle, incomplete information can explain apparent deviations from utility-
maximizing behavior: decision makers (DMs) may choose an inferior over a superior al-
ternative if they are not aware that the superior one is available. Yet traditional decision
theory focuses exclusively on situations in which choice of one option over another re-
ﬂectsanunderlyingpreference. This“revealedpreference”approachbreaksdownwhen
information is incomplete.
In contrast with decision theory, search theory is premised on incomplete informa-
tion (Stigler 1961). Given the tension between the principle of revealed preference in
standard decision theory and search theory, it is understandable that there are few link-
ages between them.
We develop a uniﬁed theoretical and experimental framework to help bridge the
gap between search theory and the principle of revealed preference by characterizing
models of choice that incorporate the process of information search. We ﬁrst consider
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a model of “alternative-based” search (ABS), in which the DM searches sequentially
through the available options, comparing searched options in full according to a ﬁxed
utility function. We consider also “reservation-based” search (RBS), a reﬁnement of ABS
underwhichtheDMsearchesuntilanobjectisidentiﬁedwithutilityaboveaﬁxedreser-
vation level.
While ABS and RBS represent important classes of search behavior, neither provides
testable restrictions for standard choice data. Without additional ad hoc assumptions,
any pattern of ﬁnal choice is rationalizable with either model. We therefore consider
a richer data set, which we call choice process data, with which to test the models.
These data convey not only the ﬁnal option that the DM selects, but also how his choice
changes during the period of contemplation prior to making the ﬁnal selection.1 By
so enriching the data, we are able to characterize whether incomplete information and
search can explain apparent violations of utility maximization.2
The key to the axiomatic characterization of the ABS and RBS models is understand-
ing what type of behavior implies a revealed preference in the context of each model. In
neithercasedoesﬁnalchoiceofoneobjectoveranothernecessarilyindicatepreference,
as the decision maker may be unaware of the unchosen object. However, in both cases,
a DM who changes his choice from one object to another is interpreted as preferring the
later-chosen object. The necessary and sufﬁcient condition for the ABS model to hold is
that this information must be “consistent” in the sense of being acyclic. Under the RBS
model, there may be additional revealed preference information in the ﬁnal choice it-
self, as in a set comprising objects all of which are below reservation utility, search must
be complete.
The ABS and RBS models both treat search order as unobservable. This makes it
natural to develop stochastic variants, given that search order is not a priori ﬁxed and
that there is no reason to believe that search from a given set will always take place in
the same order. The stochastic versions of ABS and RBS are developed in Section 4.
While stochasticity adds to the technical intricacy of the model, there is no conceptual
difference between the deterministic and the stochastic cases: the stochastic results are
precise analogs of their deterministic counterparts.
The process of information search provides one particular channel by which choice
can be affected by seemingly unimportant features of the environment, such as the po-
sitioning of objects on the screen or in a shop. This in turn could lead to behavioral
phenomena such as framing effects, status quo bias, and stochastic choice. Our mod-
els imply that when driven by search, these phenomena will have distinctive patterns.
For example, if stochastic choice is driven by RBS and random search order, choice is
random among choice sets consisting of above-reservation items, but deterministic in
sets containing only below-reservation items. Characterizations in this spirit of framing
effects, status quo bias, and stochastic choice are given in Section 5.T o b e c l e a r , o u r
approach to these phenomena does not well describe several of the most well studied
cases.
1These data previously were considered by Campbell (1978).
2Block and Marschak (1960) explicitly anticipated the need to enrich standard choice data to separate
utility-based from information-based sources of randomness in choice.Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Search, choice, and revealed preference 21
The uniﬁed approach to theory and experiment that we take in this paper rests on
two key premises.
Premise 1. ABS and RBS represent broad styles of search that may be undertaken in a
wide variety of different decision making environments.
Premise 2. It is conceptually and experimentally feasible to collect data on the evolu-
tion of “intended” choice with contemplation time.3
Withregardtotheﬁrstpremise,westudyABSandRBSbecauseweseethemasbroad
search modes that are of particular interest. We think that ABS-style search is a natural
way to model search behavior in many environments—particularly when there is a cost
of switching attention from one alternative to another, or if items can be understood
only in their entirety. It is also the canonical model of search within economics: search
is alternative-based in most labor market models, as well as Stigler’s (1961) model of
price search, and Simon’s (1955) boundedly rational model of search. In addition to its
central role in the theoretical canon, there is also experimental evidence suggesting that
ABS may be a good description of search in some environments (e.g., Reutskaja et al.
forthcoming and Payne et al. 1988, 1993). Similarly, we see RBS as a natural ﬁrst model
of search termination. It is the stopping rule suggested by Simon (1955)i nh i sw o r ko n
satisﬁcing and it also bears an interesting relationship with optimal search in certain
environments.4
With regard to the second premise, in Section 6 we outline an experimental design
that captures data on the evolution of provisional choices with contemplation time.
Subjects are presented with a collection of objects from which they must choose. They
can select an option at any time by clicking on it and can change their selection as many
times as they like. The key to the experimental design is that the subject’s choice is not
recorded at the point at which they press the ﬁnish button, but at a randomly selected
time unknown to the subject. This ensures that it is in the interest of the subjects to al-
wayskeepselectedtheircurrentlypreferredoption. AsdetailedinSection 6,Caplinet al.
(forthcoming) conduct a proof-of-principle experiment in which both ABS and RBS are
broadly supported.
Whileimportant,ABSandRBSarenotuniversallyapplicable. Thereareothermodes
of search available, such as those in which objects are compared on an attribute-by-
attribute basis. Hence ABS may be more prevalent in environments in which there are
high costs to switching among searched objects (for example, if the items of search were
3There is a gap between the theoretically ideal data and the data our experiments generate. The model
assumes that we can identify not just one, but all best options at each point in time. In contrast, the experi-
ment considers only a single choice at each point in time. A similar gap is encountered in tests of standard
rationality axioms.
4While we do not explicitly derive ABS or RBS as resulting from optimal search, it is true that a
reservation-based stopping rule is optimal within the class of ABS search behavior for a DM who has ﬁxed
costs of search and is not learning about his environment. Moreover, the optimal reservation level does not
depend on the size of the choice set the DM is choosing from, only the cost of search and the perceived
distribution of object values.22 Caplin and Dean Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
indifferentphysicallocations)orwherealternativesarebestunderstoodholistically(for
example, a written description of a ﬁnancial contract). In contrast, if it is easy to com-
pare different alternatives on the same dimension, we might expect ABS to be a poor
description of behavior. ABS also appears less intuitively compelling when objects are
easy to identify, yet difﬁcult to compare. In such less favorable contexts, our tests pro-
vide formal tools for understanding how the environment impacts search style, which
in turn may impact the nature and extent of incomplete information.
We see our approach as complementary to other attempts to use novel data to un-
derstand information search based on eye tracking or Mouselab (e.g., Payne et al. 1993,
Gabaix et al. 2006, Reutskaja et al. forthcoming). These approaches make aspects of the
search process observable, yet do not connect these intermediate acts of search with
their implications for choice. In comparison, choice process data miss out on poten-
tially relevant visual and other cues on search behavior, but capture the moment at
which the search that has been undertaken changes the DM’s assessment of the best
option thus far encountered.5 The connection of eye tracking and Mouselab data with
standard theories of choice has yet to be characterized.
In the theoretical literature, Rubinstein and Salant (2006) also focus on data enrich-
ment. They study choices made from sets presented in “list” order. In their main result,
they assume that the order of the list is known to an outside observer, effectively making
the order of search observable. In this setting, they characterize a choice procedure by
which the list order is used only to break ties in the case of indifference. The tie can be
broken either by choosing the ﬁrst or last of the optimal objects in the list. By contrast,
we treat search order as unobservable and assume that people may not fully examine
the available set.
Ours is not the ﬁrst or only effort to bridge the gap between decision theory and
search theory. An alternative approach is to identify restrictions on more standard
choice data deriving from particular search procedures. Masatlioglu and Nakajima
(2009) characterize choices that result when the search path that is adopted depends
only on an initial (externally observable) reference point. Ergin (2003), Manzini and
Mariotti (2007), and Ergin and Sarver (2010) also characterize the implications for stan-
dard choice of various decision making procedures that produce incomplete informa-
tion. Masatlioglu et al. (2009) identify objects that a decision maker is actively consid-
ering by assuming that the removal of unconsidered objects cannot affect choice. We
believethatthesevarious approachesareallworthpursuing and thattheintensiﬁcation
of interest among decision theorists in incomplete consideration of options is overdue.6
5More broadly, prior experimental work on search and choice has made use of data that are less readily
related to choice: the time taken in arriving at a decision (Busemeyer and Townsend 1992, Rustichini 2008),
direct observation of the order of information search using Mouselab (Payne et al. 1993, Ho et al. 1998,
Johnson et al. 2002, Gabaix et al. 2006), eye movements (Wang et al. 2010), and verbal responses (Ericsson
and Simon 1984).
6In addition to playing an essential role in search theory, the fact that decision makers effectively choose
among a small subset of potentially available options is familiar in the marketing literature. One of the cen-
tral challenges in marketing is how to get an option to be actively considered, rather than being rejectedTheoretical Economics 6 (2011) Search, choice, and revealed preference 23
2. Alternative-based search:T he deterministic case
2.1 The choice process
To characterize our models of search, we use an enriched data set we call choice process
data. Rather than record only the alternative that is ﬁnally chosen by the DM, choice
processdatatrackhowchoiceevolveswithcontemplationtime. Assuch,choiceprocess
data come in the form of sequences of observed choices. Let X be a nonempty ﬁnite set
of elements representing possible alternatives and let X denote nonempty subsets of X.
Let Z be the set of all inﬁnite sequences from X with generic element Z ={ Zt}∞
1 ,w h e r e
Zt ∈ X/∅ for all t ≥ 1.F o rA ∈ X,d e ﬁ n eZA ⊂ Z to comprise all such sequences selected
from A,
ZA ={ Z∈ Z | Zt ⊂ A for all t ≥ 1} 
Definition 1. A (deterministic) choice process (X C) comprises a ﬁnite set X and a
function, C :X → Z such that C(A)∈ ZA ∀A ∈ X.
Given A ∈ X, choice process data assign not just ﬁnal choices (a subset of A), but
a sequence of such choices that represent the DM’s choices after considering the prob-
lem for different lengths of time. We let CA denote C(A) and CA(t) ∈ A denote the tth
element in the sequence CA,w i t hCA(t) referring to the objects chosen after contem-
plating A for t periods. Choice process data represent a relatively small departure from
standard choice data, in the sense that all observations represent choices, albeit choices
constrained by time.
2.2 ABS
Our ﬁrst model captures the process of sequential search with recall, in which the DM
evaluates an ever-expanding set of objects, choosing at all times the best object thus far
identiﬁed. We say choice process data have an alternative-based search (ABS) repre-
sentation if there exists a utility function and a nondecreasing search correspondence
for each choice set such that what is chosen at any time is utility-maximizing in the
corresponding searched set. To deﬁne this, we introduce ZND ⊂ Z, the nondecreasing
sequences of sets in Z:
ZND ={ Z∈ Z | Zt ⊂ Zt+1 for all t ≥ 1} 
Definition 2. Choice process (X C) has an ABS representation (u S) if there exists a
utility function u:X → R and a search correspondence S:X → ZND,w i t hSA ∈ ZA for




sight unseen. The literature on “consideration sets” reﬂects this focus on product awareness as a neces-
sary prelude to product choice (e.g., Alba and Chattopadhyay 1985, Roberts and Lattin 1991). Eliaz and
Spiegler (forthcoming) study the behavior of a ﬁrm that can use costly marketing devices to manipulatethe
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The ABS model describes a DM who always chooses the best objects that he has
searched. At time t, objects are either searched, and so in SA(t),o rn o ts e a r c h e d . A l l
objects that are searched are compared in full according to a ﬁxed utility function. Since
the DM is assumed to recall all past searches, SA(t) is nondecreasing and the choice
made by the DM weakly improves over time. It is this assumption that gives the concept
of ABS empirical traction. Note that the ABS model makes no assumptions concern-
ing how or why a decision maker decides to stop searching—there is no restriction on
how the function S behaves in the limit. There is also no restriction on the ﬁrst object
searched, since it may be the only object identiﬁed.
Given that ﬁnal choice of x over y is unrevealing with incomplete search, the ABS
characterization relies on an enriched notion of revealed preference. To understand the
required enrichment, it is useful to consider behavioral patterns that contradict ABS.
To describe these patterns, we use the notation C(A)= B1;B2;   ;Bn! with Bi ⊂ A to
indicate that the sets B1     Bn are chosen sequentially from A,w i t hBn being the ﬁnal
choice. WecanreadilyidentifyfourpatternsofchoiceprocessdatathatcontradictABS.7
• Cα({x y}) = x;y;x!.
• Cβ({x y}) = x;{x y};y!.
• Cγ({x y}) = y;x!; Cγ({x y z}) = x;y!.
• Cδ({x y}) = y;x!; Cδ({y z}) = z;y!; Cδ({x z}) = x;z!.
Choice process Cα contains a preference reversal: the DM ﬁrst switches to y from x.
As y has been chosen by the DM, it must be in the searched set when he chooses x,
implying that x is preferred to y. However, the DM then switches back to y, indicating
thaty ispreferredtox. ChoiceprocessCβ involvesy ﬁrstbeingrevealedtobeindifferent
to x,a sx and y are chosen at the same time. Yet later y is revealed to be strictly preferred
to x,a sx is dropped from the choice set. In Cγ, the direction in which preference is
revealed to be between y and x changes between the two element and three element
choice set. Choice process Cδ involves an indirect cycle, with separate two element sets
revealing x as preferred to y, y as preferred to z,a n dz as preferred to x.
Astheseexamplessuggest,theappropriatenotionofstrictrevealedpreferenceinthe
case of ABS is based on the notion of alternatives being replaced in the choice sequence
over time. A DM who switches from choosing y to choosing x at some later time is inter-
preted by the ABS model as preferring x to y. As search is nondecreasing, the DM must
be aware of y when he chooses x. Thus the choice of x over y indicates revealed pref-
erence. Similarly, if we ever see x and y being chosen at the same time, it must be that
the DM is indifferent between the two alternatives. We capture the revealed preference
information implied by the ABS model in the following binary relations.
Definition 3. Given choice process (X C), the symmetric binary relation ∼ on X is
deﬁned by x ∼ y if there exists A ∈ X such that {x y}⊂CA(t) for some t ≥ 1. The binary
7We drop the braces around singleton sets: x;y;x! conveys selection of choice sets {x}, {y}, and {x}.Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Search, choice, and revealed preference 25
relation C onX isdeﬁnedbyx  C y ifthereexistsA ∈ X ands t ≥ 1suchthaty ∈ CA(s)
and x ∈ CA(s +t),b u ty/ ∈ CA(s +t).
For a choice process to have an ABS representation it is necessary and sufﬁcient for
the revealed preference information captured in  C and ∼ to be consistent with an un-
derlying utility ordering. Our characterization of ABS therefore makes use of Lemma 1,
a standard result that captures the conditions under which an incomplete binary rela-
tion can be thought of as reﬂecting some underlying complete pre-order.8 Essentially,
we require the revealed preference information to be acyclic.
Lemma 1. Let P and I be binary relations on a ﬁnite set X,w i t hI symmetric, and deﬁne
PI on X as P ∪I. There exists a function v:X → R that respects P and I,
xPy  ⇒ v(x)>v(y)
xIy  ⇒ v(x)= v(y) 
if and only if P and I satisfy only weak cycles (OWC): given x1 x2 x3     xn ∈ X with
x = x1 PIx2 PIx3···PIxn = x1,t h e r ei sn ok with xk Px k+1.
Armed with this result, we establish in Theorem 1 that the key to existence of an ABS
representation is for  C and ∼ to satisfy OWC.9 This OWC condition is closely related to
the standard strong axiom of revealed preference. It is readily testable, and various met-
ricshavebeendevelopedtomeasurehowcloseadatasetistosatisfyingsuchconditions
(see Dean and Martin 2009 for a review). Corollary 1, which is essentially immediate,
characterizes equivalent representations of a choice process for which  C and ∼ satisfy
OWC.
Theorem 1. Choice process (X C) has an ABS representation if and only if  C and ∼
satisfy OWC.
Proof.B y Lemma 1, the result is equivalent to establishing that (X C) admits an ABS
representation if and only if there exists a function v:X → R that respects  C and ∼ in
the sense of the lemma. Certainly, if an ABS representation (u S) exists, x ∼ y implies
u(x) = u(y) since both achieve the same maximum, while if x  C y,t h e nu(x) > u(y)
follows from y ∈ CA(s) ⊂ SA(s) ⊂ SA(s + t) with t ≥ 1 in which u(x) is maximal, while
8Note that Lemma 1 is a direct corollary of Theorem 2.6 in Bossert and Suzumura (2009).
9While their paper has a different set up, there is a natural relation between our OWC condition and
the dominating anchor axiom in Masatlioglu and Nakajima (2009). Under a natural translation between
the two settings, OWC implies the dominating anchor axiom but not vice versa. Masatlioglu and Nakajima
(2009) consider extended choice problems that map choice sets and a reference point to ﬁnal choice. The
dominating anchor axiom states that, for any set S, there exists a “best” option x such that if x is the refer-
ence point and some element from S is chosen from set T, that elementmust be x itself. Our axiom implies
this if we assume that the starting point is always searched. Under this condition, a violation of the dom-
inating axiom would also lead to a violation of our OWC condition (as every item in the set S would have
been revealed inferior to some other element in S). However, the dominating anchor axiom does not imply
our OWC condition, as it has nothing to say about intermediate (i.e., nonﬁnal) choices.26 Caplin and Dean Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
u(y) is not. Conversely, if a function v:X → R exists that respects  C and ∼ on X,w e






To show that (v S∗) forms an ABS representation of (X C), we show that CA(t) com-
prises all elements that are maximal in S∗
A(t) according to v:X → R. Note that if
x ∈ CA(t),t h e nx  C y or x ∼ y for all y ∈ S∗
A(t),w h e r e u p o nv(x) ≥ v(y) follows from
the fact that v respects  C and ∼ on X. Conversely, suppose that we can ﬁnd x ∈ S∗
A(t)
satisfying v(x)≥ v(y)forall y ∈ S∗
A(t) butwith x/ ∈ CA(t). Inthiscase, all y ∈ CA(t) satisfy
y  C x, implying that v(y)>v(x), which contradiction completes the proof. 
Corollary 1. Utility function v:X → R and search correspondence S:X → ZND form
an ABS representation of (X C) if
(i) v respects  C and ∼
(ii)

s≤t CA(s) ⊆ SA(t) ⊆ CA(t)∪{x ∈ X | v(x) < v(y) y ∈ CA(t)} for all A ∈ X, t ∈ N.
Note from Corollary 1 that there are strong limits to what can be said about search
order. It characterizes representations as involving a utility function v that respects  C
and ∼ on X, a search correspondence S that must include at least all objects that have
been chosen from all sets A at times s ≤ t, and that may also contain any additional
elements that have utility strictly below that associated with chosen objects according
to v. Hence all that can be asserted deﬁnitely is that items rejected along the path were
searched, while those revealed preferred to the currently chosen objects were not. Items
that are never chosen may or may not have been searched. This implies that the more
switches there are between objects in the choice process data, the more restricted is the
search order.10
Given that a utility function v:X → R can form the basis for an ABS representation,
note that any strictly increasing transform of v will still form an ABS representation in
combination with precisely the same set of search correspondences. However, we can
also change the function v in nonmonotonic ways that do not contradict the informa-
tion in  C and ∼.F o re x a m p l e ,i fX ={ a b c} and  C contains only {(a b) (c b)}, while
∼ is empty, the consistent utility functions do not restrict the ranking of a against c,s o
that nonmonotonic changes to the utility function may still form part of an ABS repre-
sentation. However, Corollary 1 states that the upper bound on what may be contained
in SA(t) is determined by the set of objects that have utility lower than those being cho-
sen from A at time t. Thus, nonmonotonic changes in the utility function may change
the set of permissible search functions.
10A reasonable prior, e.g., that search is in list order (Salant and Rubinstein 2008), may enrich the infer-
ences one can make from choice process data. This theory of search order would be supported if chosen
options were only replaced by items higher in the list. Support would be even stronger if the selected op-
tions were the successive maxima in list order.Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Search, choice, and revealed preference 27
3. Reservation-based search:T he deterministic case
Since the ABS model says nothing about the stopping rule for search, we augment it
with a simple “reservation utility” stopping rule in that search continues until an object
is found that has utility above some ﬁxed reservation level, whereupon it immediately
ceases.11 We believe that RBS is an interesting model in its own right, as many of the
search models currently used within economics fall into this category. These include
search models in labor economics and industrial organization, as well as the satisﬁcing
procedure ﬁrst introduced by Simon (1955).
Thekeytotheempirical contentofRBS isthatonecanmakeinferences astoobjects
that must have been searched even if they are never chosen. Speciﬁcally, in any set in
whichtheﬁnalchoicehasbelow-reservationutility,itmustbethecasethatallobjectsin
the set are searched. Hence ﬁnal choices may contain revealed preference information.
Intuitively, an RBS representation is an ABS representation (u S) in which a reser-
vation level of utility ρ exists, and in which the above- and below-reservation sets
X
ρ
u ={ x ∈ X | u(x) ≥ ρ} and X\X
ρ
u play critical roles. Speciﬁcally, search stops if and
only if an above-reservation item is discovered, so that search is complete if there
are no above-reservation items available. To capture this notion formally, we deﬁne
CL
A = limt→∞CA(t) as the ﬁnal choice the DM makes from a set A ∈ X as well as limit
search sets SL
A ≡ limt→∞SA(t) ∈ X. Note that for ﬁnite X, the existence of an ABS repre-
sentation guarantees that such limits are well deﬁned.
Definition 4. Choice process (X C) has a reservation-based search (RBS) representa-
tion (u S ρ)if (u S) forms an ABS representation and ρ ∈ R is such that, given A ∈ X,
the following statements holds.
R1. If A∩X
ρ




u  = ∅,t h e n
(a) there exists t ≥ 1 such that SA(t)∩X
ρ
u  = ∅
(b) SA(t)∩X
ρ
u  = ∅  ⇒ SA(t) = SA(t +s) for all s ≥ 0.
Condition R1 demands that any set containing no objects above reservation utility
is fully searched. Condition R2(a) demands that search must at some point uncover an
elementof theabove-reservation set if present in thefeasibleset. Condition R2(b) states




satisfy R1 if we set the reservation utility ρ such that X
ρ
u = X. Similarly, data that allow
an ABS representation can also trivially satisfy R2 alone by setting ρ such that X
ρ
u = ∅.
11One can readily allow for reservation rules that condition on immediately observable features of the
choice set, such as its cardinality. Tyson (2008) considers the implications for ﬁnal choice of a reservation
level that decreases as the choice sets get larger. However, Tyson assumes that the observable data are the
set of all above-reservation objects in a particular set.28 Caplin and Dean Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
As with the ABS model, the key to characterizing the RBS model is to understand the
corresponding notion of revealed preference. As RBS is a reﬁnement of ABS, it must be
the case that behavior that implies a revealed preference under ABS also does so under
RBS. However, the RBS model implies that some revealed preference information may
alsocomefromﬁnal choice, withsets thatcontain onlybelow-reservationutility objects
being completely searched.
The following cases that satisfy ABS but not RBS illustrate behaviors that must be
ruled out.
• Cα({x y}) = x;y!; Cα({x z}) = x!; Cα({y z}) = z!.
• Cβ({x y}) = x;y!; Cβ({x y z}) = x!.
In the ﬁrst case, the fact that x was replaced by y in {x y} reveals the latter to be
preferredandtheformertobebelowreservationutility. Hencethefactthatxwaschosen
from {x z} reveals z to have been searched and rejected as worse than x, making its
choice from {y z} contradictory. In the second, the fact that x is followed by y in the
choice process from {x y} reveals y to be preferred to x,a n dx to have utility below the
reservation level (otherwise search must stop as soon as x is found). The limit choice
of x from {x y z} therefore indicates that there must be no objects of above-reservation
utility in the set. However, this in turn implies that the set must be fully searched in
the limit, which is contradicted by the fact that we know y is preferred to x and yet x is
chosen.
These examples indicate the additional revealed preference information inherent
in the RBS model. Under an RBS representation, when a unique ﬁnal choice is made
from two objects x y ∈ X, either of which has below-reservation utility, then we can
conclude that the chosen object is strictly preferred. To see this, suppose that y has
below-reservationutility. Inthiscase,ifitischosenoverx,itmustbethatxwassearched
and rejected. Conversely, suppose that x is chosen over y. In this case, either x is above
reservation, in which case it is strictly preferred to y, or it is below reservation, in which
case we know that the entire set has been searched, again revealing x to be superior.
To use this insight to characterize when an RBS representation exists, we deﬁne a
class of binary relations  L
D on X for any set D ∈ X. These binary relations capture the
revealed preference information that would be derived from ﬁnal choice with D as the
set of below-reservation utility objects. These binary relations  L
D on X are then united
with the information from  C to produce the new binary relation  R
D that captures the
revealed preference information from the RBS model under the assumption that D is
the below-reservation set.
Definition 5. Given a choice process model (X C) and set D ∈ X, the binary relation
 L
D on X is deﬁned by x  L
D y if {x y}∩D  = ∅,a n dt h e r ee x i s t sA ∈ X with x y ∈ A and
x ∈ CL
A,y e ty/ ∈ CL
A. The binary relation  R
D is deﬁned as  L
D ∪  C and R
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that an object must have utility below the reservation level if we see a DM continue to
search even after they have found that object. We call such an object nonterminal.
Definition 6. Givenchoiceprocess(X C), deﬁne the nonterminal set XN ⊂ X,
XN ={ x ∈ X |∃ A ∈ X s.t. x ∈ CA(t) and CA(t)  = CA(t +s)for some s t ≥ 1} 
Using this concept, Proposition 1 characterizes the below-reservation sets that ad-
mit an RBS representation. The result establishes that below-reservation sets must sat-
isfy three properties. First, they must contain all nonterminal elements. Second, they
must be closed under R
D:i fx is below reservation and is revealed at least as good as y,
then y mustalsobebelowreservation. Third,  R
D and ∼ mustsatisfyconditionOWC.We
prove the proposition in Appendix 1.
Proposition 1. A choice process model (X C) admits an RBS representation with
below-reservation set D if and only if
(i) XN ⊂ D
(ii) if x ∈ D and x R
D y,t h e ny ∈ D
(iii)  R
D and ∼ satisfy OWC.
AnecessaryandsufﬁcientconditionforanRBSrepresentationisthereforethatthere
is some set D that satisﬁes these conditions. Note that if the third condition is satisﬁed
for some set D, it will be satisﬁed for any D∗ ⊂ D:i fD∗ ⊂ D,t h e n R
D contains  R
D∗,s o
that if  R
D (along with ∼) satisﬁes OWC, then so will  R
D∗. Thus the relevant necessary
and sufﬁcient condition is that the revealed preference information generated by the
smallest below-reservation set that satisﬁes (i) and (ii) satisﬁes OWC.
To identify such a set, we introduce the indirectly nonterminal set. This is the set of
objects in X that are either directly revealed as nonterminal or are revealed as inferior
to a nonterminal object.
Definition 7. Given choice process (X C), deﬁne the indirectly nonterminal set
XIN ⊂ X as
XIN = XN ∪{x ∈ X |∃ A ∈ X y∈ XN with x y ∈ A and y ∈ CL
A} 
It is clear that any below-reservation set must contain XIN:i fy ∈ XN and y is chosen
fromA,thentheentiresetmusthavebeensearched,revealingunchosenelementstobe
worse than y. However, it is also true that if  R
XIN and ∼ satisfy OWC, then XIN satisﬁes
conditions (i) and (ii). Thus, choice process data admit an RBS representation if and
only if  R
XIN and ∼ satisfy OWC. Given its importance, we suppress the XIN subscript for
preference relations deﬁned using this below-reservation set (i.e.,  R= R
XIN). We prove
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Theorem 2. A choice process (X C) has an RBS representation if and only if  R and ∼
satisfy OWC.
The following corollary characterizes the set of equivalent RBS representations.
First, one identiﬁes all possible below-reservation sets through Proposition 1.G i v e n
such a set, which must include XIN, one checks that the utility function respects the
resulting revealed preference information. Finally, the search correspondence is con-
structed as it was in the ABS model in the period before search stops, with no further
search allowed once an above-reservation element is identiﬁed.
Corollary 2. A utility function v:X → R, reservation level ρ,a n dS:X → ZND form an
RBS representation of a choice process if and only if
(i) D ={ x ∈ X | v(x)<ρ} satisﬁes the properties of Proposition 1




s≤t CA(s) ⊆ SA(t) ⊆ CA(t)∪{x ∈ X | v(x) < v(y) y ∈ CA(t)} for all A ∈ X, t ∈ N
(iv) SA(t)∩X
ρ
v  = ∅  ⇒ SA(t) = SA(t +s) for all s ≥ 0
(v) A∩X
ρ
v = ∅ ⇒ SL
A = A.
4. The stochastic model
The ABS and RBS models both treat search order as unobservable, and characterize the
extent to which it is recoverable from choice process data. This makes it natural to de-
velop stochastic variants, since there is no reason to believe that search from a given set
will always take place in the same order. We therefore generalize the deterministic mod-
els of Sections 2 and 3 to allow for stochasticity. This allows us to develop stochastic ver-
sions of the RBS and ABS models, in which choice is generated from the maximization
of a ﬁxed utility function against a stochastic search sequence.
4.1 ABS
Weintroduceaprobabilityspaceon Z,theclassofinﬁnitesequencesfrom X.T h ep r o b -
ability model is built upon standard foundations using cylinder sets.
Definition 8. GivenT ≥ 1 and Y ⊂ XT, deﬁne the cylinder set H(Y T)by
H(Y T)={ Z ∈ Z | (Z1     ZT) ∈ Y} 
Deﬁne the algebra G =
∞
T=1{H(Y T)| Y ⊂ XT}∈2Z,d e ﬁ n eF =σ(G) as the σ-algebra
generatedbyG,anddeﬁneP asallprobabilitymeasureson(Z F),withgenericelement
P ∈ P.
We deﬁne the stochastic choice process as a mapping from sets A ∈ X to probability
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Definition 9. A stochastic choice process (SCP) (X  ˜ C) comprises a ﬁnite set X and a
function ˜ C :X → P such that ˜ CA ≡ ˜ C(A)has support ZA ⊂ Z.
As in the deterministic case, a stochastic choice process has an ABS representation
if it can be viewed as resulting from maximization of a utility function in the context of
some process of search, with the searched set never shrinking. However, we allow the
search process to be stochastic. We will use ˜ S:X → PND to denote a stochastic search
function, where PND ⊂ P identiﬁes probability measures on (Z F) with support ZND,
the nondecreasing elements of Z.G i v e nA ∈ X and F ∈ F,l e t ˜ CA(F) and ˜ SA(F),r e s p e c -
tively, denote the measure assigned to F by ˜ C(A)and ˜ S(A).12
Definition 10. Stochastic choice process (X  ˜ C) has a stochastic ABS representation
(u  ˜ S) if there exist u:X → R and ˜ S:X → PND such that ˜ C is the stochastic choice
process derived by optimizing u against ˜ S,













for all A ∈ X F∈ F 
ThetheoremthatcharacterizesthestochasticABSrepresentationisessentiallyiden-
tical to that in the deterministic case. It simpliﬁes notation to deﬁne join and replace-
ment sets Jxy Rxy ⊂ Z for x y ∈ X,w h e r eJxy is the set of choice processes in which x
and y are chosen at the same time, while Rxy are those in which y is replaced by x:
Jxy ={ Z ∈ Z |{ x y}⊂Zt for some t ≥ 1}
Rxy ={ Z ∈ Z | y ∈ Zs x∈ Zs+t y / ∈ Zs+t for some s t ≥ 1} 
Measurability of Jxy Rxy ⊂ Z is established in Appendix 2.
For purposes of establishing the stochastic ABS representation, we deﬁne x to be
revealed strictly preferred to y if Rxy has strictly positive measure and deﬁne x to be
revealed indifferent to y if the set Jxy has strictly positive measure.
Definition 11. Given stochastic choice process (X  ˜ C), the binary relation ∼
˜ C on X is
deﬁnedbyx ∼
˜ C y ifthereexistsA ∈ X withx y ∈ Aand ˜ CA(Jxy)>0. Thebinaryrelation
 
˜ Con X is deﬁned by x  C y if there exists A ∈ X with x y ∈ A and ˜ CA(Rxy)>0.
As before, the condition for the characterization is that this revealed preference in-
formation is consistent with a ﬁxed underlying utility function.
Theorem 3. Stochastic choice process (X  ˜ C) has a stochastic ABS representation (u  ˜ S)
if and only if  
˜ C and ∼
˜ C satisfy OWC.
12That the set of Z ∈ Z with argmaxx∈Zt u(x)∞
t=1 ∈ F is measurable is demonstrated in Appendix 2.32 Caplin and Dean Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
4.2 RBS
As in the deterministic case, the deﬁnition of a stochastic RBS representation requires
the analysis of limit behavior. Given B ∈ X,w ed e ﬁ n eLB to be the F-measurable subset










In Appendix 2 it is shown that a stochastic choice process model (X  ˜ C)with stochastic








Hence, given a stochastic choice process model (X  ˜ C)with stochastic ABS representa-
tion (u  ˜ S) and A ∈ X, we can deﬁne limit choice and search probability measures ˜ CL
A
and ˜ SL
A on X endowed with the discrete σ-algebra,
˜ CL
A(B) = ˜ CA(LB) and ˜ SL
A(B) = ˜ SA(LB) for any B ∈ X.
As in the deterministic case, the deﬁnition of stochastic RBS involves a utility func-
tion u:X → R andalevelofreservationutility ρthattogetheridentifyabove-reservation
set X
ρ
u ≡{ x ∈ X | u(x) ≥ ρ}.G i v e nZ ∈ Z, a key random variable in the stochastic RBS
representation is the ﬁrst time that reservation utility is hit. To simplify notation in the
stochastic version of RBS, we let H
ρ
u :Z −→ N∪∞denote this ﬁrst hitting time associ-





inf{t | Zt ∩X
ρ
u  = ∅} if Zt ∩X
ρ
u  = ∅ for some t
∞ otherwise.
That hitting times are F-measurable functions is standard.
We use the notion of hitting times to deﬁne the stochastic version of the RBS model.
Definition 12. Stochastic choice process (X  ˜ C) has a stochastic RBS representation
(u  ˜ S ρ) if (u  ˜ S) forms a stochastic ABS representation and ρ ∈ R is such that, given
A ∈ X, the following statements hold:
RS1. If A∩X
ρ




u  = ∅,t h e n
(a) ˜ SA{Z ∈ Z | H
ρ
u(Z) is ﬁnite}=1
(b) ˜ SA{Z ∈ Z | ˜ SL
A = ˜ SA(H
ρ
u(Z))}=1.
As with ABS, the stochastic RBS characterization is the precise analog of the deter-
ministic version, and relies on the identiﬁcation of directly and indirectly nonterminal
sets. We deﬁne  y ⊂ Z to be the set of sequences in which y ∈ X appears at some point,
but the sequence changes thereafter. Measurability is established in Appendix 2.Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Search, choice, and revealed preference 33
Definition 13. Given stochastic choice process (X  ˜ C),d e ﬁ n et h enonterminal set
˜ XN ⊂ X as
˜ XN ={ x ∈ X |∃ A ∈ X with x ∈ A and ˜ CA( x)>0} 
Deﬁne the indirectly nonterminal set ˜ XIN as ˜ XNand elements rejected with positive
probability in favor of an element of XN,
˜ XIN = ˜ XN ∪





The deﬁnition of revealed preference in the stochastic RBS model can now proceed
in line with the deterministic case.
Definition 14. Given stochastic choice process ( ˜ X C), the binary relation  
˜ L on X is
deﬁned by x  
˜ L y if ({x}∪{y})∩ ˜ XIN  = ∅,a n dt h e r ee x i s t sA ∈ X with x y ∈ A and B ⊂ A
with x ∈ B, y/ ∈ B and ˜ CL
A(B) > 0. Binary relation  
˜ R is deﬁned as  
˜ L ∪ 
˜ C.
Using this deﬁnition, the standard application of Lemma 1 characterizes existence
of an RBS representation.
Theorem4. Stochasticchoiceprocess(X  ˜ C)hasastochasticRBSrepresentation(u  ˜ S ρ)
if and only if  
˜ R and ∼
˜ C satisfy OWC.
4.3 Sketch of proofs
The proofs of Theorem 3 and of Theorem 4 are detailed in Appendix 3. We limit our-
selves in this discussion to presenting structural elements. Both proofs work by reduc-
ing the stochastic case to its deterministic counterpart. The key step involves showing
that nothing is lost by “compressing” choice process data by removing time periods in
which choice does not change.
Definition15. Stochasticchoiceprocess (X  ˜ C)iscompressedif ˜ CA(ZCOM) = 1 forall
A ∈ X,w h e r e ,
ZCOM ≡{ Z ∈ Z | Zt = Zt+1  ⇒ Zt = Zt+s all s ≥ 1} 
In the ﬁrst step of the reduction, a given stochastic choice process (X  ˜ C) is associ-
atedwithauniquecompressedchoiceprocessbyremovingallperiodsofconstancy(see
Appendix 3 for details). The process of compression reduces to equivalence an inﬁnite
number of choice processes differing only in the delay between switches.
Theﬁrstobservationthatmakescompressionvaluableistheinvarianceofkeyprop-
erties under compression and its inverse, decompression. It is immediate that the or-
derings  
˜ R,  
˜ C,a n d∼
˜ C are preserved under both operations. It is equally immediate
that ABS and RBS survive under both compression and decompression, since one uses
exactly the same utility function and reservation utility in the representation of the orig-
inal process and its transformation, using compression only to change the search corre-
spondence by removing repetition in the case of compression and inverting suitably in
the process of decompression.34 Caplin and Dean Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)





˜ C satisfy OWC is ﬁnite. While the formal deﬁnitions and proof are in Appendix 3,
the intuition is simple. Both ABS and OWC imply that a compressed stochastic choice
process must stop changing within a number of periods that matches the cardinality of
the power set of X.
The bottom line of this reduction process is that the proofs of Theorems 3 and 4,
detailed in the appendix, are provided only for ﬁnite models, with the extension to the
general case being immediate. The critical observation in establishing the ﬁnite case is
thatanyﬁnitestochasticchoiceprocesses(X  ˜ C)canbeidentiﬁedwithanappropriately
deﬁned convex combination of deterministic choice processes.
5. RBS and nonstandard behavior
The stochastic RBS model allows for two channels by which seemingly unimportant
changes in the decision making environment might lead to changes in the choices peo-
ple make. First, they may impact the probability distribution over paths of search. Sec-
ond, they may impact the level of reservation utility. These changes can, in turn, lead
to framing effects, status quo bias, and stochastic choice of a speciﬁc form that we now
characterize.
5.1 Framing effects
To model framing effects, let   comprise abstract elements γ ∈   that we refer to as
frames. For example, these frames may represent different ways in which objects are
physically displayed to the DM. Let  :  → ¯ C be a mapping from frames to the class ¯ C
of stochastic choice processes on (Z F),w i t h (γ) the process associated with γ ∈  .
We seek to characterize data sets in which all choice processes regardless of frame
can be derived from a common underlying utility function, but with frame-speciﬁc
search orders and reservation utilities. Such a characterization is experimentally use-
ful, since it indicates conditions under which one can derive information on prefer-
ences in a low search cost (hence high reservation utility) environment that will apply
equally in a higher search cost (hence lower reservation utility) frame in which choice
process data yield less direct evidence on preferences. It turns out that we need to ap-
ply OWC to a binary relation that appropriately uniﬁes revealed preference information
across frames. In the statement, ¯ S denotes the set of all stochastic search processes on
(Z F).
Definition 16. Deﬁnex  
˜ R( ) y if x  
˜ R y according to some stochastic choice process
 (γ) for some γ ∈  . Similarly deﬁne x ∼
˜ C( ) y if x ∼
¯ R y according to some stochastic
choice process  (γ) for some γ ∈  .
Theorem 5. Given ﬁnite set X,f r a m e s ,a n d :  → ¯ C, there exists a utility function
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processes  :  → ¯ S such that (u  (γ) ρ(γ)) forms a stochastic RBS representation of
 (γ) ∀γ ∈   if and only if  
˜ R( ) and ∼
˜ C( ) satisfy OWC.
The proof is given in Appendix 4.
5.2 Status quo bias
One particular class of framing effect that can be explored using the RBS model is status
quo bias—the increased likelihood of selecting a particular object simply because it is
the status quo or currently selected option (Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988). We can
model such behavior as a framing model in which each status quo gives rise to its own
frame. To capture status quo bias, we posit that the status quo object is always the ﬁrst
object searched in any choice environment.
Under this assumption, the stochastic RBS model makes particular predictions
about how status quo will affect choice. For above-reservation utility objects, status quo
bias will be complete: when such objects are the status quo, then they will always be
chosen, as the DM is immediately aware of their existence and will indulge in no further
search. However, if the status quo object is below-reservation utility, then it will not be
chosen unless it is the highest utility object in the choice set, in which case it will be
chosen regardless of the status quo, as the stochastic RBS model implies that search will
be complete in such cases. Thus, the RBS model implies a form of status quo bias that
has two extremes: either an object will always be chosen when it is the status quo or the
status quo will have no effect.
5.3 Stochastic choice
ItisclearthatthestochasticRBSmodelcangiverisetostochasticchoiceintheformofa
probability distribution over ﬁnal choices. Even with a ﬁxed utility function, ﬁnal choice
will be random if the order of search is random and search is incomplete. However,
this distribution will be of a particular form: choice may be stochastic among above-
reservation objects, while objects with below-reservation utility are never chosen. In
the simplest possible case with all search orders being equally probable, ﬁnal choice is
deterministic and consistent for choice sets made up only of below-reservation items,
whereas for choice sets containing above-reservation items, there is an equal chance
of choosing any such item. Observed stochasticity in choice will therefore increase as
reservation utility falls.
6. Eliciting choice process data in the laboratory
For the above results to advance our understanding of incomplete search and choice,
one must be able to experimentally identify the path of provisional choices over the pre-
decision period. We sketch the approach that Caplin et al. (forthcoming) (CDM) use to
generate just this data and we describe results for a highly stylized experiment.
Subjects in the experiment were presented with various subsets of a larger choice
set, from each of which they had to make a choice. They were given a ﬁxed time win-
dow within which to choose from among each ﬁxed set of available alternatives. They36 Caplin and Dean Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
were allowed to select any alternative at any point in a ﬁxed time window.13 They were
informed that they could change the selected alternative whenever they wished. Rather
than being based on ﬁnal choice alone, actualized choice was recorded at a random
pointinthegiventimewindowthatwasrevealedonlyattheendoftheexperiment. This
incentivized subjects to always have selected their current best option in the choice set.
Itisforthisreasonthatweinterpretthesequenceofselectionsascomprisingprovisional
choices.14
Our ﬁrst experiment using this interface was deliberately stark, missing the conﬂict-
ingprioritiesthatmaytypifymoreintricatedecisions. Theobjectsofchoicewerekeptas
simple as possible, and were subject to clear and universal preferences: all options were
deterministic dollar amounts. To render the problem nontrivial, the dollar amount for
each option was represented as a sequence of addition and subtraction operations. The
simplicityofthesettingenabledustoexploretheABSandRBSmodelsinanuncluttered
and “friendly” experimental context.
Each experimental round began with the topmost, and worst, option of $0 se-
lected.15 Subjects could at any time select any of the alternatives on the screen, with the
currently selected object being displayed at the top of the screen. In each round there
was a time constraint, with subjects having up to 120 seconds to complete the choice
task (though this constraint was binding only in about 5% of the rounds). A subject who
ﬁnished in less than 120 seconds could press a submit button, which completed the
round as if he had kept the same selection for the remaining time. Treatments varied in
the number of alternatives available and in the complexity of each alternative.
Asonemightexpect,theexperimentprovidedsupportforABS-stylesearch. Subjects
madeseveralselectionsinthecourseofaroundandgenerallyswitchedfromlowervalue
to higher value objects over time. In the context of the experiment, this is equivalent
to ﬁnding positive support for the ABS model of search. A more striking ﬁnding was
that behavior was well approximated by the RBS model. While behavior did change
as the number of available options and their level of complexity was varied, it did so




behavior. Standard choice data do not allow one to pin down when such deviations are
13As with tests of standard choice theory, this experiment uncovers only one most preferred element
rather than all such elements. This opens some daylight between the theoretical deﬁnition of choice
process data and the experimental data.
14In support of this interpretation, 58 of 76 subjects in a post-experiment survey responded directly that
they always had their most preferred option selected, while others gave more indirect responses that sug-
gest similar behavior (e.g., having undertaken a recalculation before selecting a seemingly superior alter-
native).
15The subjects knew that the $0 option was the worst in the choice set. They therefore had the incentive
to immediately change their selection, which is consistent with the ABS model with this being the only
object searched. The model is restrictive only when a switch is made, at which point it implies that the
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caused by changing preferences and when they result from incomplete information. We
develop clean procedures for accomplishing this separation by expanding beyond stan-
dard choice data to include data on the evolution of choice with time. We character-
ize standard alternative-based and reservation-based procedures that are ubiquitous in
search theory. Experimental investigation of choice process data is ongoing.
Appendix 1: RBS
ProofofProposition1. Toprovesufﬁciency,wenotefromLemma1that(iii)implies
existence of u:X → R that respects  R





Note from (ii) that CL{x y}=y whenever y ∈ X\D and x ∈ D, implying y  R
D x and
u(y) > u(x),andhencethatX/D= X
ρ
u. MimickingtheproofofTheorem1,onecanthen
deﬁne a search correspondence such that (u S) together form an ABS representation,
SA(t) =

s≤t CA(s) for t<T( A )

s≤T(A)CA(s)∪L(A) for t ≥ T(A),
where T(A)≡ min{t ≥ 1 | CA(t) = CL
A} is the time at which choice ﬁrst achieves its limit
and L(A) comprises all elements of A with utility strictly below maxx∈CL
A
u(x).W en o w
show that all requirements for (u S) and ρ together to form an RBS representation with
reservation set X\D are met.
• R1. When A∩X
ρ
u = ∅ and so A ⊂ D, we know that x ∈ CL
A and y/ ∈ CL
A  ⇒ x  L
D y,
so that u(x) > u(y).H e n c eCL
A = argmax{x∈A}u(x) with SL
A = A by construction.
• R2(a). If A ∩X
ρ
u  = ∅ and so A∩X\D  = ∅,t h e nCL
A ∩D = ∅ since x ∈ CL
A ∩ D and
y/ ∈ CL
A  ⇒ u(x) > u(y), contradicting the fact that utility is strictly higher on X\D
than on D. Hence there exists t ≥ 1 such that CA(t)∩X
ρ
u  = ∅.
• R2(b). If CA(t) ∩ X
ρ
u  = ∅,t h e nCA(t) ∩ XN = ∅ by (i), implying directly that
CA(t +s)= CA(t) for all s ≥ 1, by construction. It is therefore the case that
SA(t +s)= SA(t) for all s ≥ 1 as required.
That condition (i) of the proposition is necessary for an RBS representation follows
directly from property R2(b) of RBS deﬁnition, which implies that XN ⊂ D is required
for D to be a reservation set. Given Lemma 1, to prove that (iii) is necessary, it suf-
ﬁces to show that u represents  R





u is the corresponding reservation set. The fact that u represents  C
and ∼ is direct since (u S) forms an ABS representation of (X C).T o s e e t h a t  L
D is
respected, suppose to the contrary that x  L
D y but u(y) ≥ u(x). Note in this case that
x ∈ D, since y ∈ D  ⇒ x ∈ D and {x∪y}∩D  = ∅ by deﬁnition of x  L
D y.B u tt h e nb yR 1 ,
x ∈ CL
A  ⇒ CL
A = argmaxx∈Au(x);h e n c eu(y) < u(x) since y/ ∈ CL
A. This contradiction38 Caplin and Dean Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
establishes that u indeed represents  R
D and ∼ . With this we know that condition (ii)
of the proposition is necessary, since x ∈ D  ⇒ u(x) < ρ,w h e r e u p o nx R
D y implies
u(y) < ρ,h e n c ey ∈ D, completing the proof. 
Proof of Theorem 2. To prove sufﬁciency, we show that the conditions of the propo-
sition are satisﬁed in this casefor D = XIN. For (i) and (iii) this is direct. Hence it sufﬁces
to establish that if x ∈ XIN and x R y,t h e ny ∈ XIN. By deﬁnition x ∈ XIN implies that
we can ﬁnd z ∈ XN with z  L x.N o w ,i fCL
{y z} = y,w eh a v et h a tx R y  R z  L x,v i o -
lating OWC. Thus it must be the case that z  L y, implying by deﬁnition that y ∈ XIN,a s
required. To show that  R and ∼ satisfying OLC is necessary for (X C) to have any RBS
representation (u S ρ),i ts u f ﬁ c e sb yLemma1toshowthatsuch u:X → R mustrespect
 R and ∼. This follows directly for  C and ∼ since (u S) forms an ABS representation
of (X C).T oc o n ﬁ r mt h a tu:X → R respects  L,c o n s i d e rA ∈ X with x y ∈ A, x ∈ CL
A,
y/ ∈ CL
A,a n dx or y ∈ XIN.T h e r ea r et w oc a s e s .
• If u(x) < ρ,t h e nx ∈ CL
A  ⇒ A∩X
ρ
u = ∅ by R2(a); hence SL
A = A by R1, and hence
u(y) < u(x) for all y ∈ A with y/ ∈ CL
A.
• If u(x) ≥ ρ,t h e nx/ ∈ XIN follows directly from condition 2(b) of the RBS deﬁnition,
so that y ∈ XIN ⊂ X\X
ρ
u and u(y) < ρ ≤ u(x). 
Appendix 2: Measurability
We show that various sets are contained in the σ-algebra F.
• ZCOM and ZND:G i v e nT ≥ 1,d e ﬁ n eNDT as all subsets of XT that are nondimin-
ishing, Zt ⊂ Zt+1 for all 1 ≤ t ≤ T,a n dd e ﬁ n eNRT as all subsets of XT in which










{Z ∈ Z | (Z1     Zt) ∈ NRt Zt = Zt+s}

∈ F 
• Note that {Z ∈ Z |{ argmaxx∈Zt u(x)}∞
t=1 ∈ F}∈F for any F ∈ F can be expressed






 ∃Y ∈ F s.t. argmax
x∈Zt
u(x) = Yt ∀t ∈{ 1     T}

 
• For any x y ∈ X,t h es e t sJxy, Rxy,a n d x:G i v e nA ∈ X,d e ﬁ n eWA as all supersets
of A and deﬁne W C
A ⊂ X as its complement. Deﬁne the cylinder sets WA(t) and
WC
A(t) ∈ G by
WA(t) ≡{ Z ∈ Z | Zt ∈ WA}
WC
A(t) ≡{ Z ∈ Z | Zt ∈ W C

























{Z ∈ Z | Zt = B Zt+s  = B}

∈ F 
• ZNCY ={ Z ∈ Z | Zt+1  = Zt  ⇒ Zt+s  = Zt any s ≥ 1} (see Appendix 3): First, index
all sets in X, A1 Am     AM,w i t hM the cardinality of X.D e ﬁ n e (M) to be all
permutations of the ﬁrst m ≤ M integers. Given πm ∈  (M), deﬁne the countable
set ϒ(πm) to comprise all strictly increasing sets of m natural numbers,
ϒ(πm) ={ Tm ={ Tm
1  Tm
2      Tm
m}|Tm
1 = 1 Tm
i ∈ N and Tm
i <Tm
i+1 for all i ≥ 1} 





{Z ∈ Z | Zt = Aπm
i for Tm
i ≤ t<Tm
i+1 1 ≤ i ≤ m−1;
Zt = Aπm
m for t ≥ Tm
m} 
• E(Y) (see Appendix 3): Given K nonnegative integers sk,d e ﬁ n eS0 = 0 and partial
sums Sk =
k









{Z ∈ Z | Zτ = Zk
for Sk−1 +1 ≤ τ ≤ Skand 1 ≤ k ≤ K}

∈ F 









Proof. Since (X  ˜ C) has an ABS representation (u  ˜ S), we know that ˜ SA(ZND) = 1.
Note that since X is ﬁnite, limit elements exist for all Z ∈ ZND, establishing that
˜ SA{









B∈X LB implies that there must be some t such that Zt = Zt+s ∀s ≥ 0;t h u si t
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Appendix 3: Theorems 3 and 4
We ﬁrst formally deﬁne compression, from which it follows immediately that it is sufﬁ-
cient to prove Theorems 3 and 4 for compressed stochastic choice processes. We then
show that compressed stochastic choice processes of interest are ﬁnite, further simpli-
fying the requirements to establishing Theorems 3 and 4 for ﬁnite stochastic choice
processes. Next, we show that ﬁnite stochastic choice processes can be represented
as weighted averages of deterministic processes. We close out by proving Theorems 3
and 4 for the ﬁnite case, which proof is general in light of the earlier results.
A3.1 Compression
Definition 17. Given Z ∈ Z, deﬁne the set of times at which Z changes in sequential
fashion starting with τ1(Z) = 1 as
τj+1(Z) =
	
mins≥1{Zτj(Z)+s  = Zτj(Z)} if ∃s ≥ 1 s.t. Zτj(Z)+s  = Zτj(Z)
∞ if Zτj(Z)+s = Zτj(Z) for all s ≥ 1.
Let J(Z)∈ N ∪∞be the number of distinct points of change, and deﬁne the compres-
sion of any element Z ∈ Z, D(Z) ∈ ZCOM, by removing all time indices in which there is
repetition and repeating the limit element if there is any repetition,
D(Z) =
	
(Zτ1(Z)     Zτj(Z)     ZτJ(Z)(Z)     ZτJ(Z)(Z)     ZτJ(Z)(Z)) if J(Z)is ﬁnite
(Zτ1(Z)     Zτj(Z)    ) if J(Z)=∞ .
Given Y ∈ ZCOM, deﬁne the equivalence classes of compressed elements of E(Y) ⊂ Z
(the proof that E(Y) ∈ F is in Appendix 2),
E(Y) ={ Z ∈ Z | D(Z) = Y} 
Given a measure P ∈ P, deﬁne its compression DP ∈ P by shifting probabilities onto the
compressed representative of each equivalence class,
DP(Y) =
	
P(E(Y)) for Y ∈ ZCOM
0 for Y = Z\ZCOM.
A3.2 Compression and ﬁniteness
Proposition 3. A compressed SCP that has an ABS representation or for which  
˜ C and
∼
˜ C satisfy OWC is ﬁnite, in that there exists a ﬁnite set G ∈ F such that ˜ CA(G) = 1 for all
A ∈ X.
Proof. To show that compression and ABS imply that the SCP is ﬁnite, let M =| X| and
let Z(M) ∈ F be sequences that are unchanging after period M:
Z(M) ={ Z ∈ Z | Zt = Zs ∀t s>M} 
It is intuitive that a compressed choice sequence with an ABS representation satisﬁes
¯ CA(Z(M)) = 1 ∀A ∈ X. To conﬁrm, consider the union of all cylinder sets with Zt  = ZsTheoretical Economics 6 (2011) Search, choice, and revealed preference 41
for some t s>M. If any element Z in this set is to be in ZCOM,i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a t ,
for some r w < s, Zr = Zw and r  = w ±1. Consider now the cylinder sets deﬁned by
{Z ∈ Z | Zt  = Zs Zr = Zw} 
Now take any k such that r<k<wand consider the cylinder set
{Z ∈ Z | Zt  = Zs Zk  = Zr = Zw} 
These cylinder sets must have measure zero in any choice process that has an ABS rep-
resentation, as the set of search sequences such that
argmax
x∈SA(k)





is measure zero (as any such sequence would be nonincreasing). As Z\Z(M) can be ob-
tained by the repeated countable union across {Z ∈ Z | Zt  = Zs Zr = Zw}, we know that
if a choice processis compressed and has an ABS representation, then ˜ CA(Z\Z(M)) = 0
∀A ∈ X and so ¯ CA(Z(M)) = 1.T h i si nt u r np r o v e st h a t(X  ˜ C)is ﬁnite.
To prove that a compressed SCP that satisﬁes which  
˜ C and ∼
˜ C satisfy OWC is ﬁ-
nite, note that this implies that the associated choice process must apply full measure
to ZNCY, those elements of Z in which there are no cycles (the proof that ZNCY is mea-
surable is in Appendix 2),
ZNCY ={ Z ∈ Z | Zt+1  = Zt  ⇒ Zt+s  = Zt any s ≥ 1}∈F 
To see why  ˜ C satisfying OWC implies that ˜ CA(ZNCY) = 1 for any set A ∈ X, assume
to the contrary, that there is a set of strictly positive measure according to some A ∈ X
such that Zt+1  = Zt ,y e tZt+s = Zt for some s ≥ 1. There are two possibilities. One is that
there is an element y ∈ Zt+1 with y/ ∈ Zt: in this case, consider any x ∈ Zt+1, and note
that ˜ CA(Rxy)>0 due to exit of element y and entry of element x from period t +1 to pe-
riod t +s, while also one of the statements ˜ CA(Ryx)>0 or ˜ CA(Jyx)>0 in consideration
of the entry of y in period t + 1. In the former case, the contradiction to  ˜ C satisfying
OWC is that x  
˜ C y and y  
˜ C x, while in the latter case, the contradiction is that x  
˜ C y
and y ∼
˜ C x. Alternatively, it could be that there is some y ∈ Zt and y/ ∈ Zt+1. A simi-
lar argument shows that this violates 
˜ C satisfying OWC . This establishes the required
ﬁniteness, since elements of ZCOM ∩ZNCY are unchanging after a number of periods no
larger than the cardinality of X, completing the proof. 
A3.3 Structure of the ﬁnite case
Proposition 4. A stochastic choice process (X  ˜ C) is ﬁnite if and only if it is the con-
vex combination of a ﬁnite number of deterministic choice processes, in that there exist
some J deterministic choice processes {(X Cj)}J
j=1 and weight vector λ ∈ RJ
++ satisfying
J
j=1λj = 1, and such that ˜ C =
J
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Proof. It is immediate that the convex combination of deterministic choice processes
{(X Cj)}J
j=1 is ﬁnite, since ˜ CA{Z ∈ Z |∃ j ∈{ 1     J} s.t. Z = Cj}=1 for all A ∈ X.T o
prove that any ﬁnite process (X  ˜ C) can be decomposed as the proposition asserts,
use integers 1 ≤ k ≤ K to index elements Zk of the ﬁnite set G with the property that
˜ CA(G) = 1 ∀A ∈ X: we call these the basic choice processes. Since ˜ CA(Zk) ≥ 0 and K
k=1 ˜ CA(Zk) = 1, we can use indicator functions to record the probability of any set





We now show that we can use these weights to construct a ﬁnite set of choice processes
that are able simultaneously to capture such probability information across sets F ∈ F
and A ∈ X.
First, gather together in the ﬁnite set J all values taken on by the cumulative distri-
butions taken in order according to k across all A ∈ X,
J =






˜ CA(Zi) for some A ∈ X k∈{ 1     K}

 
Index members of the set J by 1 ≤ j ≤ J in increasing order, so that xj <x j+1,w i t h
xJ = 1. Now deﬁne a family of functions fA:J → G that, for each A ∈ X,r e c o r dw h i c h
basic choice process is related to each cumulative probability level,









We use these objects to construct the ﬁnite set of choice processes of interest using
thefollowingiteration. Theprobabilityassignedtotheﬁrstdeterministicchoiceprocess
C1 is x1 and the actual speciﬁcation involves using the set-speciﬁc weights
C1
A = fA(x1) 












The above construction identiﬁes a ﬁnite set of deterministic choice processes Cj,
1 ≤ j ≤ J, and weights λj = xj − xj−1 ≥ 0, and sums to 1. We now iterate claim that, for
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i=1 ˜ CA(Zi) 
k
i=1 ˜ CA(Zi)].H e n c e








i=1 ˜ CA(Zi),s ot h a t












˜ CA(Zi) = ˜ CA(Zk) 






















A3.4 Proof of Theorem 3
Application of the compression and decompression relations establishes that the ﬁnite
case is all that needs to be considered. To prove that if ∼
˜ C and  
˜ C satisfy OWC, then
ABS follows, we apply Lemma 1 directly to show that 
˜ C satisfying OWC implies exis-
tence of ˜ u:X → R that respects the binary relations ∼
˜ C and  
˜ C .M o r e o v e r ,i nl i g h to f
the last proposition, (X  ˜ C) is the weighted average of deterministic choice processes,
˜ C =
J
j=1λjCj, which have the property that their corresponding relations ∼j and  j
are all respected by the same ˜ u:X −→ R, since ∼
˜ C and  
˜ C represent the union of these
deterministic relations:
˜ CA(Jxy)>0 if and only if x ∼j y  for some 1 ≤ j ≤ J
˜ CA(Fxy)>0 if and only if x  j y  for some 1 ≤ j ≤ J 
ReapplicationofLemma1toeachofthedeterministicchoiceprocesses{(X Cj)}J
j=1 im-
pliesthat∼j and j satisfyOWCforallj,andmoreoverthattheutilityfunction ˜ u:X → R
forms part of some ABS representation of them, further ensuring the existence of deter-
ministic search processes Sj such that (˜ u Sj) forms ABS representations of (X Cj) for








t=1, we can immediately conﬁrm that (˜ u  ˜ S) forms a sto-
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But as ˜ SA{Z ∈ Z | Z = S
j



























The last equality follows from the fact that, ∀j ∈{ 1     J}, ˜ SA(˜ SJ
A) = λj.
To prove that ABS implies that ∼
˜ C and  
˜ C satisfy OWC, note that if (˜ u  ˜ S) forms an
ABS representation of (X  ˜ C), Lemma 1 then implies that ˜ u respects the orderings ∼
˜ C
and  
˜ C on X, which therefore satisﬁes OWC. 
A3.5 Proof of Theorem 4
As for ABS, the proof needs to be given only for the ﬁnite case in light of the compres-
sion and decompression operations. This ﬁnite prooffollows from ageneralized version
of the RBS characterization precisely as the deterministic result followed from Proposi-
tion 1. To prove the relevant result, we need to generalize the ordering 
˜ R of Section 4.
Definition 18. Given a stochastic choice process ( ˜ X C) and set D ∈ X, the binary
relation  
˜ L
Don X is deﬁned by x  
˜ L
D y if {x ∪ y}∩D  = ∅,a n dt h e r ee x i s t sA ∈ X with
x y ∈ A with ˜ CL
A{x} > 0 and ˜ CL
A{y}=0. The binary relation  




Proposition 5. A ﬁnite stochastic choice process model (X  ˜ C)has a stochastic RBS rep-
resentation (u  ˜ S ρ) with below-reservation set D ⊂ X if and only if the following state-
ments hold.
(i) ˜ XN ⊂ D.
(ii) If x ∈ D and x 
¯ R
D y,t h e ny ∈ D.










Proof. The proof that conditions (i)–(iii) of the proposition are sufﬁcient is construc-
tive, and similar to that in the deterministic case. As there, we deﬁne a utility function
u:X → R that respects  
˜ R
D and ∼ on X, deﬁne reservation utility ρ as the average be-
tween the maximum on the set D and the minimum on the set X\D, and demonstrate
again that X\D is the reservation set associated with the utility function u:X → R and
reservation utility level ρ by noting that u(x) > u(y) whenever x ∈ X\D and y ∈ D.T o
see this, note that x ∈ X\D and y ∈ D imply by condition (ii) above that CL
{x y}({x}) = 1,
whereupon x  
˜ R
D y,s ot h a tu(x) > u(y) by construction.
We now consider all deterministic processes Cj in the decomposition of the ﬁnite
stochastic choice process map ˜ C that we know by Proposition 4 to be available. Deﬁne
XN
j as the nonterminal set associated with deterministic choice process (X Cj), andTheoretical Economics 6 (2011) Search, choice, and revealed preference 45
deﬁne also the corresponding binary relations ∼j,  Cj
,  Lj
D ,  Rj
D , Cj
, Lj
D ,a n dRj
D .
We show now that any set D ⊂ X with properties (i)–(iii) above for the stochastic choice
process (X  ˜ C) necessarily satisﬁes the corresponding deterministic properties (i)–(iii)
established in Theorem 2 to be necessary and sufﬁcient for D to be a reservation set in
some RBS representation of each (X Cj). With respect to the ﬁrst such property, note
directly from the deﬁnition that any nonterminal element in (X Cj) is necessarily so in
the stochastic models, so that XN
j ⊂ ˜ XN;h e n c eXN
j ⊂ D as required. The second and
third properties follow directly from the fact that, for any j ∈{ 1     J}, x  Rj
D y ⇒ x  
¯ R
D y
and x ∼j y ⇒ x ∼ y. To see this, note ﬁrst that x  Rj
D y implies that either x  Cj
y or
x  Lj
D y. Theformercaseindicatesthatforsome A ∈ X, ˜ CA(Rxy) ≥ λj > 0 andso x  Cj
y,
whilethelatterimpliesthat,forsomeA ∈ X andB ⊂ A,x ∈ B,y/ ∈ B,and ˜ CL
A(B) ≥ λj > 0,
so x  L
D y. In each case, x  
¯ R
D y. A similar argument shows that x ∼j y implies for some
A ∈ X, ˜ CA(Jxy) ≥ λj > 0 and so x ∼ y. This result shows that any violation of conditions
(ii) and (iii) at the level of the deterministic choice process j would lead to a violation of
the equivalent condition at the level of the stochastic choice function.
Given that the assumptions of Theorem 2 are satisﬁed, we conclude not only that
there exists an RBS representation of each (X Cj) with reservation set D, but also that
the utility function u:X → R and reservation utility level ρ can be utilized in construct-
ing such a representation, given that these are precisely the objects that are constructed
in the course of the deterministic proof. Hence, for each j, there exists a search corre-
spondence Sj such that (u Sj ρ)represents an RBS representation of (X Cj).W es h o w
nowthat(u  ˜ S ρ)comprisesanRBSrepresentationof(X  ˜ C),wher e˜ S isthecorrespond-





That (u  ˜ S)for a stochastic ABS representation follows as in the proof of the ABS rep-
resentation theorem. That X\D ={ x ∈ X | u(x) ≥ ρ} holds by construction. Moreover,
given A ∈ X, we know that if A ∩ (X\D) = φ,t h e nA is searched fully in all search cor-
respondences Sj, ensuring that ˜ SL
A(A) = 1. Alternatively, if A ∩ XR ∩ (X\D)  = φ,t h e n
weknow thatinthelimit, searchreachesintothereservationsetinallsearchcorrespon-
dences Sj, ensuring that ˜ SA{Z ∈ Z | HR(Z) is ﬁnite}=1. Finally, since each element in
the reservation set has the property that search ceases at once with probability 1 when
suchanelementisencounteredineachSj,weknowthat ˜ SA{Z ∈ Z | ˜ SL
A = ˜ SA(HR(Z))}=
1, completing the proof that (u  ˜ S ρ)comprises an RBS representation of (X  ˜ C).
The proof that conditions (i)–(iii) above are necessary for a ﬁnite stochastic choice
process (X  ¯ C) to have an RBS representation (u  ˜ S ρ) is essentially identical to that in
the deterministic case. We let D be the below reservation set generated by that repre-
sentation and establish that the three conditions of the proposition hold. 46 Caplin and Dean Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
Appendix 4
ProofofTheorem5. ApplicationofLemma1translatesthetheoremtothestatement
that there exists u:X → R, ρ:  → R,a n d :  → ¯ S such that (u  (γ) ρ(γ)) forms a
stochastic RBS representation of  (γ) ∀γ ∈   if and only if there exists v:X → R that
respects  
˜ R( ) and ∼
˜ C( ). To see that existence of such a function v:X → R is necessary,
note from Theorem 4 that the given function u:X → R such that (u  (γ) ρ(γ)) forms a
stochastic RBS representation of  (γ) for all γ ∈   respects  
˜ R(γ) and ∼
˜ C(γ) for all γ ∈  
and hence respects  
˜ R( ) and ∼
˜ C( ) . Conversely, given v:X → R that respects  
˜ R( )
and ∼
˜ C( ), by deﬁnition it respects  
˜ R(γ) and ∼
˜ C(γ) for all γ ∈  ,w h e r e u p o nTheorem 4
implies that there exists an RBS representation of  (γ) for all γ ∈  . In fact, the proof
of Theorem 4 reveals that the given function v:X → R that respects  
˜ R(γ) and ∼
˜ C(γ)
can form the basis for an ABS representation with appropriately deﬁned ρ:  → R and
 :  → ¯ S,w i t h(v  (γ) ρ(γ)) therefore forming the required stochastic RBS represen-
tation of  (γ) ∀γ ∈  . 
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